





Does Legal Interpretation Need Paul Grice? 




By significantly diminishing the role intentions play in communication, in Imagination and Convention (2015) Lepore and Stone attempt to overthrow the Gricean paradigm which prevails in the philosophy of language. The approach they propose is attractive to theorists of legal interpretations for many reasons. Primary among these is that the more general dispute in the philosophy of language between Griceans and non-Griceans mirrors the dispute between intentionalists and non-intentionalists in legal interpretation. The ideas proposed in Imagination and Convention naturally support the non-intentionalist camp, which makes them unique in the contemporary philosophy of language. 

In this paper I argue that despite an almost universal acceptance for the Gricean paradigm in legal interpretation, a strong, externalist approach to language, one in which interpretation is based on conventions, not intentions, better reflects the nature of legal language. The latter functions in societies as a written, public discourse to which many individuals contribute; the number of contributions renders the identification of individual intentions impossible, making it badly suited to a Gricean, intention-based analysis. Lepore and Stone’s discourse-based, non-Gricean alternative provides a better tool for the theorist of legal interpretation to analyse legal language.  





1. Introduction: why Imagination and Convention is an important book for lawyers

Hans-Georg Gadamer once pointed out that legal interpretation is a paragon for all kinds of interpretation (Gadamer 1975). In their new book, Imagination and Convention​[1]​ (further I&C), Lepore and Stone (further L&S) follow suit: one of the first references they make is to Blackstone​[2]​. This invocation of the famous British lawyer clearly illustrates that the universal reliance on intentions in interpretation extends far beyond the philosophy of language.  Indeed, the main preoccupation of the book is whether either this reliance or its universality are justified.

If there is a field almost totally conquered by the fixation on speaker’s intent as a crucial meaning-constituting factor, it is the field of legal interpretation. Because of its fixation on intent (most commonly supported by the works of Paul Grice), legal interpretation can surely benefit from a position in the philosophy of language that systematically criticises Grice and thereby provides a counterpoint for a prevailing paradigm. I&C goes some way to providing this counterpoint; before seeing how it does this, let us first examine why Grice has attracted so many followers and why alternative proposals did not gain equal traction.

The attractiveness of the Gricean framework in legal interpretation is easy to explain. Legal philosophers tend to picture the lawmaker as a speaker: a person who conveys their thoughts via communication that more or less resembles a face-to-face conversation. The Gricean framework, with its focus on the empathic recognition of speaker’s intentions, suits this picture very well. It is, after all, the main task of the interpreter to recognise the will of the lawmaker, and by doing so to elevate the lawmaker’s position to that of the ultimate authority. Consequently, Grice’s claim that to understand is to identify the speaker’s intention is easily extrapolated into legal philosophy’s claim that to interpret the law is to recognise the lawmaker’s will. Such a position is widely represented in legal philosophy, among others by Fish (2008), Solan (2004), Soames (2008), Neale (2008) and Ekins (2013).

Gricean ideas do not have a monopoly position in legal philosophy: the theory of legal interpretation does admit the relevance of linguistic conventions. Lawyers very often interpret the legal text according to its “plain meaning”, which they understand as the literal, public meaning of that text. The plain meaning equates to the Gricean ‘sentence meaning’ and its identification relies on linguistic conventions rather than intentions. However, if an ambiguity arises within the plain meaning approach, a reference to intention is inevitable; in fact, the theories of legal interpretation see that reference as the only available tool to resolve linguistic ambiguity. Legal philosophers promoting such theories include Marmor (2014). As a consequence, even in the conventional-based approaches to legal interpretation, speaker’s intention plays a prominent role.

One can identify at least three shortcomings of the intentionalist approach in legal interpretation. First, the lawmaker is not a person, but a group of persons. Hence, an issue of aggregation of intentions arises – an issue which is difficult to overcome, to judge from the ample literature devoted to it in the field of legal philosophy​[3]​. Second, the group-lawmaker does not speak, but uses the written instrument to communicate. Unlike spoken, face-to-face communication, written communication occurs in at least two spatio-temporal contexts: that of the author and that of the interpreter. Those contexts are very often separated by long time which makes the identification of the lawmaker’s intention even more difficult. Third, the lawmaker’s communication is not based on short, isolated sentences, but comes as a discourse: a system of interconnected sentences that impact each other, sentences produced by different people and at different times​[4]​. The discursive nature of law requires an interpretative strategy that detaches itself from the particular (a particular intention of a particular producer of a particular legal sentence) and focuses more on the aggregate (the relationships between the sentences that make the body of law). In other words, law requires a holistic interpretation that is more interested in the meaning of the discourse than the meaning of its individual building blocks.

Of those three shortcomings, the most significant is that legal statutes are not produced by one person, but many. The process of legislation involves the people who draft the bill, the members of parliament who promote the draft bill as well as those who vote on it; in many legal systems, additional acceptance from a head of a state is required. Additionally, this multi-authored bill may be amended several times by subsequent legislatures. The number of possible authors and the possibility of subsequent amendments make legal text an insurmountable challenge for an interpreter looking for the intention of one, identifiable author. Naturally, one can theorise a unified intention behind legal text, but it amounts to assuming the existence of a mythical figure, a rational lawmaker. This in turn amounts to anthropomorphism, in this case, by attributing human mental states to the rational internal structure of a discourse.

Over the years, the above-listed shortcomings of the intention-based theories have given rise to theories built on different foundations​[5]​. However, attempts to abandon the fixation on legislative intent have ultimately been sidelined – unjustifiably so, in my opinion. Some of these attempts applied semantic externalism in legal interpretation, in particular to use Kripke-Putnam semantics as a tool to analyse legal language​[6]​. This approach, theoretically similar to that proposed in I&C, has been criticised in the first place for not adhering to the intention-based paradigm to legal interpretation. As Brian Bix put it, criticising the theories of interpretation based on externalist, realist semantics of Kripke and Putnam:
“law is an area where one might have special reason to pay attention to “speaker’s meaning” as contrasted with “word meaning”​[7]​. 

To recap, faced with a choice between semantic internalism, with Grice as its main representative, and semantic externalism, with convincing argumentation against its appropriateness, legal philosophy has taken the internalist side. Internalism seems to comply with the legal positivist idea of how law is produced and communicated: the lawmaker is a speaker and the law is the lawmaker’s communiqué. Contrary to this tendency, I&C shifts the focus from intentions to public conventions, and therefore naturally supports the externalist approach to meaning. As such, it constitutes a new appealing alternative for legal philosophers who take issue with the application of the internalist Gricean approach in their field. What is more, by providing convincing counter-arguments to internalist critiques​[8]​, it allows previously side-lined theories based on semantic externalism, in particular Kripke-Putnam semantics, to enter the mainstream.

2.  Lepore and Stone’s critique of Grice and neo-Griceans 

The main focus of I&C is a critique of Grice (1991) and neo-Gricean theories of language and communication, including the Relevance Theory proposed by Sperber and Wilson (Sperber, Wilson 1986)​[9]​. The authors of I&C believe that the majority of linguistic phenomena that philosophers of language explain in terms of pragmatic enrichment are in fact conventional phenomena. For instance, the Gricean and neo-Gricean framework explain conversational implicatures and disambiguation by referring to extra-linguistic factors like speaker rationality and intentions.  By contrast, L&S see such phenomena as purely linguistic.

The divergence between Grice and L&S concerns then the extent to which people rely on extra-linguistic sources in interpretation. Those sources include communicative intentions, which remain one of the main targets of L&S’s critique throughout their book. As they indicate: “we reject Grice’s particular way of grounding meaning in speakers’ intentions”​[10]​.

Besides communicative intentions, the Gricean approach makes use of other extra-linguistic sources in deriving meaning from language: general interpretive principles and the rationality of the speaker. The common denominator for all three phenomena is their link with the situation of the speaker: to understand a language is to understand a person that uses it. This speaker-based approach to meaning is a point of departure and a subject of criticism for L&S. Their approach is to focus instead on what Grice would call “sentence meaning”. Indeed, the main topic of I&C is to broaden the scope of the sentence or discourse meaning at the cost of the speaker’s meaning.

The role communicative intentions and speaker’s rationality play in Gricean approach to meaning L&S attribute to conventions. This is particularly clear in their analysis of conversational implicatures, where they claim that the derivation of meaning is not based on the principles of rationality but rather on recognising the fact that the speaker uses certain conventional linguistic tools, such as the tense and aspect of the verbs​[11]​. The meaning-constituting factor is thus not outside language, in the realm of the speaker, their mind or our representation of their mind. Rather it is inside language, in its syntax and in its semantics.

The authors start their critique with a broad overview of Gricean and neo-Gricean approaches to language and communication. They question the Gricean assumption that what we convey in communication is a combination of a literal, a-contextual meaning with contextually determined pragmatic elements, derived from a particular speaker’s state of mind or their rationality. As a consequence, in Gricean terms the success of the communication is based on the interlocutors’ capacity to 1) identify the literal meaning of the uttered sentence, 2) modify it on the basis of some rationality based reasoning.

L&S question this picture of human communication. They take issue with the assumption that there exists an acontextual meaning of the question that gets modified by the reference to the speaker’s rationality. Instead, they believe that it is not the rationality of the speaker but the linguistic conventions themselves that require a sentence to be understood in a particular way. 
An example would be useful. The acontextual, literal meaning of the question: 
(1) Can I have a French toast? 

is, according to the Griceans, to ask whether the interlocutor is physically capable of giving the toast or if the toasts are available.  The speaker, however, is making a creative use of this literal meaning, transforming the question into a request addressed to the waiter. This creative use is possible because the waiter is able to deduce the creative meaning on the basis of the speaker’s mental state (i.e. assumption that he or she knows that restaurants usually serve French toast so the question about the physical availability would be irrelevant). 

According to L&S, the semantic meaning of the (1) is to request a French toast, not to ask for the availability. They believe that the linguistic conventions require the question be understood as a request. Those conventions have been produced by a previous linguistic practice: a number of similar situations in which the sentence has been used. Other conventions govern the use of questions that are genuine questions for physical capacity or availability, not requests. For instance:
 

(2) Can I get a real Guinness in this town?
 

is a question, not a request, because the typical past contexts in which the question was asked were the contexts in which the speaker was looking for information, and not requested anything. 

To sum up, L&S claim that understanding does not involve enriching a literal reading of an utterance, but consists rather in choosing from the linguistic options provided by conventions​[12]​. Those conventions constrain or even determine a possible range of variables which can appear in particular elements of a sentence or discourse and thus limit the number of “candidates” for a final interpretation of that sentence or discourse​[13]​. Ultimately, linguistic conventions substitute the speaker’s rationality as the source of interpretative data:

“The fundamental moral, we suggest, is just this: In identifying speech acts, interlocutors rely on mutual expectations that are not determined by the dictates of rationality, or any other general interpretive principles. Our interpretive choices reflect our knowledge of the arbitrary communicative practices of our community. They are conventions. Purported arguments to the contrary, we have suggested, fail to appreciate the empirical variability of indirection across languages, the distinctively linguistic character of the rules involved, and the explanatory motivations linguistic rules always have”​[14]​. 

The shift of focus from the communicative intentions and the rationality of the speaker to linguistic conventions in interpreting communication means that phenomena like conversational implicatures (CI) or resolving ambiguity are treated as convention-based. 

As far as conversational implicatures are concerned, L&S do not question the fact that in communication people read between the lines. They call CIs a Gricean ‘pragmatic bridge between linguistics and psychology’ (p. 197) and conclude that no such a bridge is necessary for understanding language. That said, L&S do not remove this implicit content altogether – they simply redefine its nature and that of the tools necessary to discover it.  What they question is the mechanics of this reading. While Grice defines the difference between semantics and pragmatics as the difference between what is said and what is implied, L&S assume that many things implied in Gricean terms are in fact said. In other words, L&S see Gricean conversational implicatures as conventional in nature, i.e. produced by the conventions governing the semantics and the syntax of the discourse.  

L&S’s position may be perceived as endangering the validity of Gricean implicatures and by the same token undermining their utility for legal interpretation. The popularity of Gricean CIs in legal interpretation arose from their allowing one to overcome the formalistic pursuit of what the law literally says (“the letter of the law”) and to identify what the law implies (‘the spirit of the law”). After all, if one treats the lawmaker as a rational speaker, one is entitled to assume that their communication involves some implicit content. This content constitutes additional input into the explicit content of the law, input which enables the interpreter to solve puzzles that cannot be resolved by reference to the text alone.

Fortunately, L&S do not throw out the baby with the bathwater. If asked, L&S would surely answer that the content lawyers call “the spirit of the law” exists, but they would point out it has a semantic provenance, not a pragmatic one. Their approach involves focusing on linguistic conventional rules as the main source of information about meaning. For them, CIs are linguistically encoded and do not derive from the psychology of the speaker​[15]​. 

CIs are not the only phenomena that L&S redefine; they also revisit the issue of resolving ambiguity – an important one for both general language users and lawyers. Encountering a phrase or a word that has multiple meanings significantly complicates legal interpretation and has greater consequence than in other forms of communication. Unlike poetry, where linguistic ambiguity is a tool for the free play of the imagination, ambiguous language in a law makes that law’s application to the case at hand almost impossible. The famous tax-related tomato-as-fruit case of Nix vs. Hedden illustrates the point: a tax statute stipulated different tax rates for fruits and vegetables, but the ambiguity of the word ‘fruit’, namely the doubt whether it should be understood in the culinary sense (as a sweet part of a plant) or in the botanical sense (as a part of a plant developed from a flower), brought the case to the Supreme Court. The case was not trivial: the choice between the two meanings of “fruit” had significant financial consequences for the parties to it.

As in the case of identifying CI, the reference to one’s knowledge about the speaker has become a leading tool for resolving ambiguity in legal interpretation. And again, L&S instruct us to shift the attention from the speaker to the linguistic rules. As they say, the correct question to ask in case of ambiguity is not about the speaker’s rationality but about the relevant linguistic rules:

“On the ambiguity view, the question to ask is (...) What is a plausible convention that I could postulate to assign this utterance a likely intended interpretation? It’s not the Gricean question (...) How do principles of rationality and collaboration explain the creative use to which the speaker has put this utterance with its known interpretation?”​[16]​ 

Thus, in opposition to the Gricean model, the information concerning the most probable interpretation of an utterance is derived from the logical form of the discourse the utterance is part of, not from a perception of the speaker’s knowledge, rationality or intentions.

To summarize, L&S propose that instead of relying on speakers’ intentions or their rationality, interpreters should be focused on the features of their utterances. Such a proposal requires abandoning the Gricean speaker’s meaning and identifying the sentence meaning.  The latter cannot be understood in a traditional Gricean way, i.e. as the meaning of an isolated sentence, but rather as the meaning of a set of sentences structured in a particular way. The authors of I&C identify several sources of information interpreters may use to discover this interdependent sentence meaning; one of the most widely used is the structure of the discourse the sentences constitute. The sequence of sentences and the interaction of their content provide the hearer with a number of hints as to which conventions are used. The interpreter’s recognition of those hints and identification of those conventions constitutes a substitution of the rationality of the speaker by that of the discourse.  Let us now take a close look at what this analysis of discourse consists of and why it is important for lawyers.

3. Interpreting the structure of discourse instead of interpreting intentions

According to L&S, the main activity interpreters are involved in is not analysing speaker’s mind but analysing the structure of the discourse. This structure is never accidental; it is conventional.  The sequence of sentences within a discourse have a traditionally defined structure which depends on the kind of the discourse one is involved in. A literary narrative is structured according to a particular genre in which it is written, e.g. an epistolary novel consists of a number of letters that should be read together. Equally, a statute can be seen as a genre in the sense that it has a traditionally developed structure to which the writer is obliged to adhere and which broadly indicates to the reader how it should be read and interpreted. 

Following the approach of the Coherence Theorists and the Discourse Reference Theory​[17]​, the authors of I&C find the connections that make the discourse coherent in the mutual relations between the sentences constituting that discourse:

“Coherence Theory suggests that language users rely on a particular repertoire of cues and structures in organizing their discourse. (…) These patterns thus constitute a specific dimension of interlocutors’ knowledge of language, over and above the dictates of rationality in connecting sentences together in discourse.”​[18]​

In particular, L&S refer to the interpretative strategy consisting in (1) a sequential and structural reading of sentences constituting a discourse subject to interpretation (understanding a sentence in the light of previous sentences​[19]​ and in the light of the rhetorical structures it is a part of​[20]​), and (2) a reading that traces a common topic through the interpreted discourse​[21]​. 

For instance, the temporal sequence of sentences that constitute the discourse may prove useful in interpreting those sentences: the first sentence in a sequence provides a context for interpreting the subsequent one, etc​[22]​. This network of sentences serves as the point of reference for an interpreter doubtful as to the proper meaning of what was said. Ultimately, in providing guidance for interpretation, the rationality of the discourse should replace the rationality of the speakers . 

The discourse-based approach should be welcomed by the theorists of legal interpretation: the object of their activity, legal language, is a discourse. Legal language consists of myriads of interconnected sentences: a statute, for instance, is a set of sentences that must be read together, as some of the sentences provide definitions for the terms used in other sentences. Moreover, sometimes several statutes must be read together or interpreted in connection with another legal act, for example a constitution or a directive in the European Union. 

Legal discourse has several features that distinguish it from the discourses L&S analyse, such as a novel. For a start, legal discourse has no clear temporal sequence of sentences. Once enacted, a statute may be amended several times, but this does not mean that later-introduced sentences are follow-ups of the previous ones. Nor it is clear which sentences should be read together and which not. Nonetheless, legal discourse does have a structure which may be of help in its interpretation. . For instance, hierarchical relations may provide guidance in this respect: in some legal systems hierarchically lower legal acts should be interpreted in the light of the hierarchically higher ones. For example, the interpretation of the EU Member States’ internal laws should lead to conclusions that are in accordance with the EU directives and regulations: the rules that are hierarchically higher (the EU law) set the context and impact the understanding of the rules that are hierarchically lower (the internal laws of the EU member states).

Interpreters can derive hints not only from the formal structure of the discourse but also from its content. One interpretative techniques based on discourse content rather than structure is particularly appealing to lawyers: it consists of identifying a common theme across multiple sentences ​[23]​. If we treat all binding laws in aggregate as a single extensive legal text, that text contains thousands of sentences which lack a clear linear structure. Therefore, legal interpreters choose the sentences that refer to the theme that concerns them (like murder, theft or tax evasion) and link the related sentences into a larger whole: a legal rule. This process is conspicuous in the cases when a particular regulation is read together with legal definitions included in the other section of a statute, or when a full regulation regarding a crime is decoded from the legal text by merging the rule (e.g. a prohibition to kill other human beings) and the exceptions to it (killing someone in self-defence). 

For their example, L&S analyse a discourse which starts with the description of an event and then is made richer by adding new elements to the description​[24]​. What links the set of sentences concerning this event is the fact of being relevant to it. An interpreter’s recognition that a particular sentence contributes to the description of the same event is based on knowledge about the external world, not about the speaker’s state of mind. Knowledge about the world is knowledge of causal mechanisms operating in the world and of the resemblance between events and their regular co-occurrence​[25]​.  

The idea of a discourse which describes particular events is easily applicable to law.  In the example of the murder regulation given above, the legal provisions describe a certain event (killing a human being); the additional regulation (the right to protect oneself) supplements the description, thus giving the interpreter the full regulation on murder. Exactly as L&S show, the flow of sentences causes information growth, “changing information state of the audience as they accept each sentence in turn”​[26]​. Law is akin to other discourses insofar as is interpreted by putting several elements together; the link that allows different sentences be merged into one whole is a common theme or topic. 

Both analysing the discourse structure and following the common theme of the discourse are ways of making interpretation independent from the quest for speaker’s intention, and, as a corollary, independent from Grice’s theory of communication. The bottom-line of L&S’s analysis is that the discourse provide enough information to be properly interpreted and no mind-reading is necessary:

“meaning is a matter of conventions, and listeners normally recover the meanings of utterances by recognizing the conventions involved, not by reasoning about the speaker in any deeper sense.”​[27]​
 
4. A new kind of intentionalism

As shown above, the gist of L&S’s criticism is directed against Grice’s reliance on intentions as the main factors constituting meaning. That is not to say, however, that intentions play no role in I&C. What its authors propose is to replace the Gricean kind of intentionalism, a ‘prospective’ one, with a new kind, a ‘direct’ one. 

The crucial difference between the Gricean prospective intentionalism and L&S’s direct intentionalism is the direction in which speaker’s intentions reach out. Prospective intentionalism, as its name suggests, reaches out into the future, into the realm of interlocutors’ mutual expectations and the effects of their utterances​[28]​. By contrast, direct intentionalism looks into the past: the function of the interlocutors’ intentions is to indicate the traditionally developed convention they want to use. Within direct intentionalism “meaning is a function of the background commitments and relationships that govern the communicative enterprise generally”​[29]​. 

The nature of direct intentionalism is to treat speaker’s intentions as indices of conventions used in a particular discourse​[30]​. L&S refer to those indexical  intentions as “basic intentions” whose nature is to “determine the meaning of an utterance by linking it up with the relevant conventions.” ​[31]​. Those basic intentions:

“must commit to the grammatical analysis of an utterance as a way of accessing the networks of meaning in the community that the speaker participates in and determining the compositional meaning for the utterance as a whole.” ​[32]​ 

The nature of basic intentions is retrospective: they select previously existing conventions and by doing so exploit them. For this conceptualisation of the role of intentions, especially for their link with the historical linguistic practice, Lepore and Stone are clearly indebted to Kripke​[33]​. 

As in Kripke’s causal theory of reference, in L&S’s picture of communication the ability to refer to a particular object is beyond an individual speaker’s reach if there is no traditional link of causal relationships between the first reference and the subsequent references​[34]​. To communicate, an individual speaker depends on socially developed practices and conventions, not on their individual psychological states​[35]​. The speaker in L&S’s model forms the basic intention to use traditionally established conventions and those conventions do the rest; in particular, they, not the intention of the speaker, constitute the meaning of the words used​[36]​.

The picture of using language presented by L&S is one based on the interaction between the speaker and some independently existing artefacts, like words, sentences or longer discourses (understood as a sets of sentences), which are deployed in particular interactions with an intention to use them according to their independently developed cultural functions. The nature of the artefacts used, and their functions in a conversation, are pre-defined by the previous practice of a particular community. 

The difference between prospective and direct intentionalism mirrors that between two approaches to legislative intent within legal philosophy. The first, represented by legal philosophers influenced by Grice, assumes that the lawmakers have prospective intentions to give their utterances some meanings which are to be recognised by the interpreters (Ekins 2013). The other, less popular, follows (rather unconsciously) L&S’ advice to treat speaker’s intentions as selecting a conventional meaning the speaker wants to use and to contribute with this meaning to the conversation​[37]​.  A representative of the latter approach is Joseph Raz’s idea of “minimal intention”, according to which the legislature intent is limited to indicating the text that is to be law, not to constitute a particular meaning of that text. As Raz claims:

“A person is legislating (voting for a Bill, etc) by expressing an intention that the text of the Bill on which he is voting will—when understood as such texts, when promulgated in the circumstances in which this one is promulgated, are understood in the legal culture of this country—be law”​[38]​.

As with the concept of minimal intention in Raz, direct intentionalism is based on the assumption that speakers do not create meanings with their intentions, but rather select a particular meaning by directly choosing a convention they found useful in a particular case. L&S argue that the indication of the linguistic convention a speaker wants to use occurs in a direct manner: by their utterance they intend to use a particular word or a particular sentence, and commit thereby commit themselves to the traditional conventions which govern the meaning of the indicated words and sentences​[39]​. Similarly, in Raz’s concept the legislative intent is an intent to use a particular text, with all the meanings and interpretations that have been and will be conventionally assigned to it​[40]​. 

Raz’s idea of intention (and similar concepts presented by Waldron (199)) has been heavily criticised by legal philosophers working within the Gricean paradigm. Ekins (2013) treats Raz’s idea as unsuitable for legal purposes exactly because it is too minimal, too basic, and as such cannot constitute meaning. Griceans reject the claim, present within both direct intentionalism and the Razian approach, that intentions do not add anything to meaning, they do not transform a linguistic semi-product into a fully-fledged communication. The only role direct intentionalism assigns to intentions is to indicate which pre-defined convention the speaker is using​[41]​; once the indication is made, the controlling power of intentions over meaning ends​[42]​. 

The Razian idea of legislative intent receives a natural support from the ideas presented in I&C. When L&S illustrate direct intentionalism’s commitment to established linguistic practices through an analogy to practical activities, like cooking or knitting​[43]​, one can clearly see that in language and in legislation actors are involved with some predefined practice and use external objects to achieve a purpose. This analogy highlights the public character of words and sentences. If using language is like cooking, one does not create ingredients ad hoc but rather employs ready-to-use elements to prepare a dish. The same goes for legislation: the role of the speaker and the legislator is to use pre-defined linguistic tools, not to create their own. 

Just as in cooking the choice of ingredients cannot be arbitrary but depends on the purpose one wants to achieve, so too in language: the kind of the communicative activity one is involved in predetermines the tools one can use. Finally, there exist certain conventional rules according to which a cook behaves depending on the kind of dish he or she prepares. The same applies to communication: the kind one is involved in, defined by a notion of genre, imposes far-reaching constraints on the means of communication.

All in all, the focus on the practical effects of one’s activity allows L&S to dedicate less attention to the actors’ states of mind and to focus more on the practice they are involved in and the results they bring about: “Our strategy aims for a theory of social competence grounded in special features of certain kinds of real-world problems that agents must solve, and therefore avoids the need to parse the kind of mental attitudes (…).”​[44]​. For instance, a correction of mistakes in the interlocutor behaviour does not require tracing his or her intentions. Again, as in cooking, when a cook mixes two cups of salt making a cake batter, a correction of that mistake is possible on the basis of the kind (genre) of the activity this person is involved in (making a cake), not on the reference to this person’s specific intention to use salt or sugar​[45]​.

There are two main consequences of embracing direct intentionalism, both connected with the fact that the influence of private, speaker-centered factors on meaning is diminished. First, what the words mean is a matter of historically developed conventions, not the effect of a private, unique intention of the speaker. This consequence is captured by Putnam’s “meaning just ain’t in the heads”​[46]​, supported by an externalist approach of Tyler Burge and his reference to a social practice as a source of meaning​[47]​. The public meaning of the sentences used substitutes for a private meaning constituted by the speaker’s intentions​[48]​. 

Second, even if the speaker is wrong about the meaning of the words he or she uses, the correct meaning can be conveyed. This is another value of externalist approach to meaning: a scope of knowledge and mental states of language users do not have an effect on successful reference. If the speaker is able to indicate the convention, successful communication is ensured by this convention, even if the speaker’s representation of the conveyed meaning is misguided. As an effect, an autonomy of meaning emerges: the meaning provided by the historically developed convention is independent from what the speaker knows about this convention and the meaning it conveys​[49]​.  Within the direct intentionalism, the utterance can even have a meaning the speaker did not intend to convey, if their knowledge about the convention is extremely poor. Such a divergence between the intention and meaning is not conceivable within the prospective, Gricean intentionalism.  

To recap, the transformation in our thinking about language, proposed by L&S, roughly involves a shift from a semantic internalism towards semantic externalism​[50]​. Their departure from Grice and the shift towards Kripke consists of a change in focus: from the internal mental states of the speakers to external phenomena, like the social practice of using words or sentences, as proposed in Kripke’s causal theory of reference. That shift towards semantic externalism can be seen in many aspects of L&S’s theory, not only in their explicit reference to Kripke. One of its indicators is a reliance on a public, community-produced meaning​[51]​, another is the conviction that a mistaken belief of a speaker as to the object to which he or she refers does not impact successful reference​[52]​.

The shift from semantic internalism towards semantic externalism should be welcomed by legal philosophers interested in the theories of interpretation. For reasons already mentioned, legal texts require an interpretation that is based on publicly accessible data, not psychologically understood internal mental states. The question arises, however, why L&S do not propose to apply a broader and more sophisticated externalist approach to language than the Kripkean one. In the next section I consider this question and explain why a full externalist revolution would make I&C even more powerful.

5. Where Lepore and Stone’s revolution falls short 

The departure from Grice and his followers is a proposal which makes I&C an original and thought-provoking contribution to the discussion on language and communication. Nevertheless, its reader is left with a feeling that the anti-Gricean shift could have been more convincing had the authors gone even further in the externalist direction. In particular, their idea of the direct intentionalism could be more powerful if based on some non-Kripkean conceptions of linguistic conventions.  In this section I attempt to show how using alternative conceptions, especially Ruth Millikan’s idea of conventions as cross-lineages​[53]​ could make L&S’s proposal even more convincing as a general theory of communication. By the same token, it would make it far more attractive as a theoretical framework for legal interpretation.

The crucial challenge to direct intentionalism can arise from its Kripkean origins and concerns the relatively narrow scope of Kripke’s theory. The causal theory of reference, on which this new account of intentionalism is based, was originally thought to comprise only proper names and natural kind terms​[54]​. Even if there have been attempts to extend it to other terms​[55]​, the causal theory of reference has never been convincingly adapted to theoretical, moral or, for that reason, legal terms. In fact, many philosophers argued that the Kripkean concept of reference cannot be applied to those other types of terms, principally because theoretical, legal and moral kinds are mind-dependent​[56]​ and thus not tangible enough to constitute an external reality in which reference can be grounded​[57]​. They argue that semantic externalism in general and the Kripkean concept of reference in particular are based on the assumption that meanings are not in our heads, while theoretical, moral and legal terms are.

In light of this position, L&S provide surprisingly short and therefore unconvincing argumentation for the possibility of extending Kripke’s causal theory of reference beyond proper names and natural kind terms​[58]​. Strong arguments do exist that the Kripkean framework can be thus extrapolated, and there have been many successful theoretical attempts to do so, including in legal theory​[59]​. However, L&S do not draw on those arguments, which can be found within the framework of semantic externalism, though not necessarily in Kripke. By not drawing on them, they have weakened their theory. 

The ideal theoretical framework for L&S is provided by Ruth Millikan’s concept of conventions as cross-lineages. Millikan’s approach is similar to that proposed by Kripke: it is based on the externalist assumption that meanings are constituted by some repetitive word-world relations, and that those relations are historically determined. The word-world relation is instantiated by a particular uses of a linguistic tool, and the chain of those uses constitutes a lineage​[60]​, which is theoretically similar to the causal chain of usages in Kripke’s theory. If L&S are looking for a theory that encompasses a direct theory of reference and at the same time which is not limited to a relatively narrow group of terms, they should at least consider Millikan’s ​[61]​.

The applicability of Millikan’s theory to all linguistic tools, not only to proper names and natural kind terms, differs her semantics from the Kripke-Putnam one. This universal applicability exists because successful reference is based on the function of the things referred to rather than on their nature​[62]​. Within Millikan’s framework, the tangible nature of reality behind proper names and natural kind terms does not make them uniquely suitable as subject of a historical theory of reference. To the contrary, even the less tangible objects to which we refer with non-natural kind terms can be covered by the theory, because they have functions for us. Were Lepore and Stone to adopt Millikan’s more universal theory, their ideas would become more resistant to criticism from those who strive to limit the causal theory of reference to the original, rather narrow field within which Kripke applied it.

Another reason to reach out to Millikan is her own anti-Gricean critique, in particular her conviction that intentions do not play any crucial role in explaining how language works​[63]​. Within a lineage, a word or another linguistic tool (eg intonation), acquires a conventional, public function which is recognised by the hearer/reader when hearing/reading the word. In Millikan this function is not constituted ad hoc by a speaker’s intention but depends on the precedential chain of usages with which the hearer/reader is familiar due to their participation in the long-standing linguistic practice of a particular community. If the speaker’s intention plays any role in communication, it is the role of indicating the lineage in which the speaker attempts to communicate, as in L&S’s direct intentionalism. As the lineage is the convention the speaker takes the advantage of, Millikan’s approach is strikingly similar to L&S’s direct intentionalism: in both, the role of the intention is not to convey meaning but to indicate the meaning-constituting convention the speaker wants to participate in. 

As far as legal interpretation is concerned, Millikan’s approach seems far more attractive than the Kripkean one. First, even if there is no tangible reality behind legal terms, at least not the type of reality similar to that behind gold or water, legal terms do have lineages. It is true that one uses the words like “cruel and unusual punishment”​[64]​ to refer to some not fully identified reality, and that we lack a science to explain what is the real nature of the reality those words refer to. It is however also true that all the uses of “cruel and unusual punishment” create a historical chain and the subsequent application of the words are somehow linked to the previous ones. For instance, one looks for a similarity between the previous uses and the current ones to be sure one uses the word correctly. Therefore, lawyers very often refer to precedents which are simply previous uses of the same words or sentences which refer to similar realities.   

Millikan would be helpful to the authors of I&C particularly in those fields where they seem to give way to semantic internalism. L&S, like some legal philosophers mentioned earlier (Marmor 2014), cannot help but resort to the intention-based approach to language when faced with ambiguities in communication. Their thinking is simple: even if we establish the relevant conventions the speaker is relying on, resolving an ambiguity about meanings available within the convention cannot be done without consulting the speaker’s state of mind.  L&S admit that both the Gricean prospective intentionalism and their direct intentionalism acknowledge “a fundamental way in which meaning depends on what the speaker has in mind”​[65]​, and that “this is particularly clear if we consider the problem of ambiguity”​[66]​. According to them, both in prospective intentionalism and in direct intentionalism it is still the speaker’s intention that resolves the ambiguity​[67]​.

A conclusion like that is still Gricean in nature. Millikan, unlike L&S, goes further in the criticism of the intention-based theory of language and shows that even the resolution of ambiguities does not require any resort to the speaker’s state of mind​[68]​. If, following Millikan, one treats conventions as criss-crossing lineages of previous uses, ambiguities occur in situations where one cannot state precisely within which lineage a speaker is acting. In such cases, the ambiguity is resolved by reference to previous communicative situations, not to speaker intention​[69]​. In particular, according to Witek, ambiguities are resolved by identifying which lineage of previous uses the speaker is deploying​[70]​. 

Millikan goes to great pains to combat the Gricean conviction that interpreting language necessarily involves reading speakers’ minds​[71]​. Calling this mind-reading a “meaning rationalism”​[72]​ she argues that understanding means only that the hearer thinks the same content that the speaker communicates. Doing so need not involve thinking about the speaker’s mind at all, as thinking the same content can be mediated by understanding the signs the speaker uses, not the intentions behind those signs​[73]​. Within an externalist theory of language meaning, rationalism is unjustified; that L&S cannot completely overcome it (e.g. in resolving ambiguities) makes their theory slightly inconsistent.





L&S’s book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of how language works. This alone makes it a must-read for lawyers and legal philosophers: as law is a kind of language, its interpretation must be based on the best available knowledge of linguistic mechanisms. The particular value of I&C lies in its potential to act as the basis for a new programme for legal interpretation: one based on public conventions, not mind-reading. This programme sheds new light on the areas of legal interpretation dominated by Grice and neo-Griceans, and its anti-Gricean approach is welcome and promising.

I&C can be criticised for its reliance on the Kripkean version of semantic externalism and for neglecting some more sophisticated versions of realist semantics. In particular, it suffers for not drawing on support from the works of Ruth Gareth Millikan and her concept of conventions as lineages. The lack of convincing argumentation for applying externalist semantics to non-natural kind terms and the still-visible traces of “meaning rationalism” can also be counted among the book’s shortcomings. 
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